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1 T S 
In Dummett’s important paper [1] on the sorites paradox it is suggested that
the vagueness of observational predicates such as ‘. . .is red’ or more obviously
‘. . .looks red’ generates an apparent incoherence: their use resembles a game
governed by inconsistent rules. A similar incoherence is seen by Wright [18,
17] as a real and serious threat to very ordinary ideas of how language works.
Wright argues not that the use of vague predicates is incoherent but that it
would be if the use of language were a practice in which the admissibility of
moves were determined by rules whose general properties are discoverable by
appeal to non-behavioural notions. But unless we do move from anecdotes
about behaviour to just such rules, how are we to reason at all?
The incoherence in question is an outcome of the vagueness or tolerance
of observational locutions, and would seem if established for them to spread
to non-observational vague expressions like ‘. . .is water’ or ‘. . .is a test tube’,1
thus vitiating almost all of our attempts to use language consistently, even in
science. On the face of it, vagueness is everywhere, whence such deep-seated
incoherence would upset even such fragile understanding of semantics as we
have gleaned from a century’s work. The argument connecting vagueness to
incoherence, therefore, strikes at the heart of logic: every philosophical logi-
cian is called upon to respond to it.
The sorites paradox, the “slippery slope argument” or the “paradox of the
heap”, is old and famous and wears an air of sophistry. One feels that the
problem will vanish on exposure of the trivial trick involved. What is surprising
is that it is so deep and difficult after all. An example or two will help focus the
discussion.
1How long and thin must a piece of glassware be, or how polluted may a liquid be, before it
no longer counts as a test tube or as water?
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 1 Imagine a long coloured strip shading gradually from scarlet at one
end to lemon-yellow at the other, divided into 250 thin segments.2 Let R(x)
mean that the x-th segment, numbering from the red end, looks red. Then
clearly R(1). Moreover, if R(1) then R(2), because there is no discriminable
difference between them. Similarly, if R(2) then R(3) . . . and so on. Hence, by
a mere 249 applications of modus ponens, R(250).
 2 Members of successive generations of animals belong to the same
species, having very similar structure and genetic composition, being cross-
fertile, etc. Therefore chicken eggs can only be laid by chickens which can
only come from chicken eggs. So neither came first: there have always been
chickens, even in the precambrian before birds evolved.
 3 Transition from one of the Ages of Man to another is a gradual
matter. No-one becomes adolescent, elderly or middle-aged in one minute:
these things creep up on one over several years. Since one is a child at the age
of 1000 days, and since for any a if one is a child when a days old one is still a
child at a+ 1 days old, one is always a child, even after 20,000 days.
The problem here is one of aggeregation: the natural view of the situation
on the small scale does not cohere with that on the large scale. Predicates such
as ‘. . .looks red’ or ‘. . . is a chicken’ are tolerant of sufficiently small changes in
the relevant respects (colour, genetics). That is, for example, it cannot be that
of two colour patches no difference between which is directly discriminable3
one looks red and the other does not. Large changes in the same respects,
however, do make the difference between applicability and inapplicability of
the predicates; yet the large changes are made up of the small ones.
Any solution to the paradox has to generate a response to a logical argu-
ment. In the first example above the argument consists of 250 premises and a
conclusion though we might well extend it to get all the conditional premises
from a generalisation
∀x (R(x)→R(x+ 1))
to the effect that no one small change is enough to make all the difference.
There are only four possible solutions. We can:
(a) Deny that the problem is or can be legitimately set up. That is, hold that
logic does not apply to vague expressions.
(b) Accept that logic does legitimately apply here but hold that this particu-
lar argument is invalid. That is, see this argument as a counter-example
to modus ponens and so as a refutation of classical logic.
2There is no need to imagine: see http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~jks/sorites.html.
3The difference between the colour patches is always in principle indirectly discriminable, for
instance by noting that the one matches a third sample while the other does not. The sorites
paradox is not really a problem about indiscernability, however, but about any differences too
small to bear the weight of major distinctions. The “red” example could be re-worked with
about 20 colours instead of 250.
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(c) Accept both that logic applies in such cases and that the argument is
valid but deny one of the premises.
(d) Accept the argument and its premises, and hence embrace the conclusion
also.
None of these is especially attractive or easy to maintain. Option (a) is as-
sociated with Frege who famously held that a predicate with a fuzzy bound-
ary of application would lack a sense and so could not be used in a sentence
which achieved truth conditions. Unfortunately, natural languages like En-
glish or German are full of vagueness—yet evidently we do argue and theorise
using natural language and we do apply criteria of rationality to each other’s
discourse in a reasonably stable way. To take option (a) is therefore to hold for-
mal logic unfit for the purposes for which it was advertised. Such an attitude
shows a lack of respect for the ordinary. Option (b) would require that we give
up modus ponens, one of the intuitively best-attested argument forms. This too
is in conflict with certain data regarding usage and with the fact that we find
it hard to construe any connective as a conditional unless it allows that infer-
ence. Option (c) involves maintaining that no predicate is sorites-tolerant in
the canvassed sense. On such an account a difference in colour too small to be
perceptible could make all the difference between looking red and not looking
red. This is extremely counter-intuitive. To say the least, it runs against such
understanding as we have of how observational terms get their meanings and
how they are actually used.
The version of option (c) most popular with philosophers is one which
appeals to some apparatus of supervaluation. It is sometimes held that corre-
sponding to every vague predicate is a more or less determinate range of ac-
ceptable sharpenings—interpretations as precise predicates with roughly the
same extension. The truth involving a vague predicate is then just what comes
out true on every acceptable sharpening. Formally what this proposal amounts
to is the substitution of boolean-valued models for two-valued ones.4 Briefly,
my response to this idea is that while relating a vague expression to the set
of its acceptable sharpenings may well be good and useful the supervaluation
technique is not. An instructive analogy is the theory of irrational numbers in
real analysis: every irrational number can be approximated as close as you like
by rationals, so we could adopt a supervaluational view that the truth about,
say,
√
2 is what comes out true on all its acceptable rationalisations. This does
not work because irrationality matters for truth in the object language. The
sentence
∃x (x2 = 2)
4For a good presentation of a sophisticated account along these lines see [5]. For more recent
views, a good starting point is [16].
John Slaney, “A Logic for Vagueness”, Australasian Journal of Logic (8) 2010, 100–134
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2010 103
is true of the reals but false on all rationalisations. Similarly in the case of
vagueness
∀x (R(x)→ R(x+ 1))
is true of redness but comes out plain false on all sharpenings. So the superval-
uation account gets truth values wrong in some of the crucial cases.
It is worth pausing here to note another popular response to the effect
that, whether or not logic can be applied to vague discourse, there is no need to
apply it or to investigate its application to such discourse because in all cases
that matter (e.g. science) vagueness is eliminable.5 Well in the first place it
is not obvious that vagueness really is eliminable—maybe it is in physics, but
most likely not in psychology for instance—and in the second place even if
vague expressions can always be replaced by precise ones it is not clear that the
“precisified” version of the language is in any way preferable. The prejudice in
favour of precision is a legacy of outmoded philosophies of language and is long
overdue for demolition. Finally, whatever the merits of restricting attention to
precise languages this does not solve but merely ignores the problems arising
with respect to sorites-susceptible languages like scientific English which after
all fall within the intended scope of logical theory.
Dummett’s paper hints at a prima facie argument for option (d). The sorites
reasoning appears to supply a perfect case for applying a predicate like ‘. . .looks
red’ to any coloured object. This is obviously in conflict with other rules of our
language which dictate the witholding of this predicate from lemons, grass
and snow. For this reason, option (d) actually tends to collapse back into the
discredited option (a), since on the face of it if the rules of our language are
inconsistent then they are not (coherently) formalisable. Dummett says:
‘Red’ has to be a vague predicate if it is to be governed by the prin-
ciple that, if I cannot discern any difference between the colour of
a and the colour of b, and I have characterised a as red, then I am
bound to accept a characterisation of b as red. . . . But by hypothe-
sis one could force someone, faced with a sufficiently long series of
objects, . . . to admit that an object which was plainly blue . . . was
red. . . . Hence it appears to follow that the use of any predicate
which is taken as being governed by such a principle is potentially
inconsistent: the inconsistency fails to come to light only because
the principle is never sufficiently pressed. Thus Frege appears to
be vindicated, and the use of vague predicates . . . is intrinsically
incoherent.6
The form of the argument is by elimination. Ruling out options (b) and (c) will
leave us with no choice but (a)—except (d), which amounts to a version of (a).
This paper is not concerned with arguments for or against option (c). What I
5The locus classicus for this view is [9].
6[1], p. 264 of Truth and Other Enigmas.
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want to consider is Dummett’s attempt to close the door on option (b). If I can
wedge a foot in that door then the argument for the extraordinary conclusion
that vaguness defeats logic will remain less than persuasive.
Obviously it will not do simply to reject the logical principle of detachment.
An account is owed by anyone opting for a “deviant” logical solution of the
sorites paradox of why, if modus ponens is invalid, everyone thinks it a paradigm
of good reasoning. Dummett, in refusing to contemplate changing logic to deal
with vagueness, throws out a sharper challenge. If we are to take route (b):
. . . we must declare the rule of universal instantiation invalid in
the presence of vague predicates, or else regard modus ponens as
invalid in that context. . . . But either of these seems a desperate
remedy, for the validity of these rules of inference seems absolutely
constitutive of the meaning of ‘every’ and of ‘if ’.7
Well, I agree. An alternative logic has to give modus ponens a central place in
determining the meaning of its implication connective, and of course it has to
do this in such a way as to disallow the sorites argument. Yet the sorites works
by modus ponens! Thus there is a very narrow line to tread. The purpose of the
present paper is to indicate how it may be trodden.
2 T    
There is a plausible argument to the effect that truth comes in degrees which
I shall call the Simple Argument. No conclusions of this paper depend on it,
but it does create a prima facie case for option (b). It runs as follows.
‘Grass is green’ is true (in English) if and only if grass is green. That
is, the truth of ‘Grass is green’ marches together with the greenness
of grass. But greenness is a matter of degree; so truth is a matter
of degree.
As it stands, this is too simple to win many converts. Still, for the present let
us take its conclusion seriously and examine some accounts of how logic might
look were truth allowed to slide by degrees between the two poles of absolute
truth and absolute falsehood.
A first shot is to adopt as the frame for truth-valuation the whole real unit
interval instead of just its two end points, giving the continuum-valued logic of
Łukasiewicz.8 Like most first shots, this one misses, but before taking better
7Op cit, p. 252.
8Łukasiewicz himself does not seem to have proposed his continuum-valued logic as an ac-
count of vagueness, so the philosophical defects of such a proposal are not to be laid to his
account.
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aim it is worth noting how it fares with respect to Dummett’s challenge. The
connectives are defined via functions on the unit interval:
a ∧ b = max(a, b)
a ∨ b = min(a, b)
∼ a = 1− a
a→b = max(b− a, 0)
The numbers intuitively are “degrees of falsehood” or degrees by which propo-
sitions may fall short of absolute truth. The degree by which a conditional falls
short of truth is just the increase in short-falling as we pass from its antecedent
to its consequent. Propositions which are ordinarily assertible are those whose
degree of falsehood is close to zero. This is itself a vague range—rightly so,
for there is no exact boundary to the assertible—but the conditionals used to
set up the sorites argument will fall well within it. There are then two versions
of the sorites paradox, formulated with two versions of modus ponens obtained
in turn from two ways of combining premises. Roughly, premises may be col-
lected into a set and conjoined, or they may be collected into a multiset and
added. There is a sort of intensional conjunction definable thus:
A⊕B =df ∼ (A→ ∼ B)
The corresponding semantic clause is
a⊕ b = min(a+ b, 1)
Then the real modus ponens, constitutive of the meaning of ‘if ’, is the argument
form corresponding to the one-premise inference
(A→B)⊕A therefore B
This is perfectly valid, though easily confused with the superficially similar but
invalid
(A→B) ∧ A therefore B
If the sorites paradox is set up using real modus ponens, the present account
solves it by insisting that although each individual conditional premise is as-
sertible, being very close to true, in the combination of 249 of them the neg-
ligible short-fallings accumulate additively until the total falsehood is far from
negligible. If the pseudo-modus ponens is used, the paradox is solved by holding
the argument invalid as each of the 249 steps takes us further from the truth by
a tiny amount. Dummett’s challenge is at least addressed, in that modus ponens
is not abandoned but merely refined. We shall see below that the challenge can
be squarely met by a logic of this general sort, but first we should note in what
other respects Łukasiewicz continuum-valued logic is unsatisfactory.
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The reasons why the Łukasiewicz story will not do are hardly new with
this paper. Firstly, even if vagueness does require departure from the truth
to come by degrees as the simple argument suggests, these are not much like
numbers. It makes little sense to speak of one statement as being 46.92 times
as far from the truth as another, and even less to speak of it as being 21.7%
false. That is to say, while the unit interval has the appeal of mathematically
familiarity, it also has intrusive arithmetical properties which are meaningless
for the intended interpretation but which affect the logic, for instance by vali-
dating inferences like that from (A→B)→B to (B→A)→A. The total order
of the unit interval is also unconvincing: why need we be able to say of the
statement that 100 grains of salt make a pinch and the statement that grass is
brown that one is closer to the truth than the other? They would seem to differ
in kind of departure from truth and not only in degree. Secondly, the simple-
minded substitution of the unit interval for the truth values lays us open to
the higher-order sorites paradoxes, for vague statements no more have pre-
cise degree-of-truth conditions than they have precise truth conditions. The
sorites argument, then, can be re-worked with a second-order predicate like
‘The degree of falsehood of the statement that x is red is less than 0.1’ or ‘It is
falser to assert that x is red than to deny it’.
Most fuzzy logicians attempt to deal with these objections by maintain-
ing in some way that the assignments of values to statements are themselves
fuzzy. So instead of assigning precise numbers from the real unit we are to
assign more or less vaguely delimited ranges of such numbers, perhaps corre-
lated with some natural language expressions like ‘almost true’ or ‘fairly false’.
This move, of making the metalogic fuzzy as well, has some success with the
problem of higher-order paradoxes, but leaves unsolved that of intrusive arith-
metical properties. Even at the syntactic level we may ask which forms of
inference are the logically correct ones. Orthodox fuzzy logics either bite the
bullet of continuing to hold all the principles validated by Łukasiewicz logic
to be correct or bite the marshmallow of rejecting precise logical consequence
altogether in favour of the idea that vagueness extends everywhere, giving us
“approximately valid” reasoning at best. The former line I have suggested is
over-strength and under-motivated. The latter is too much of a retreat. No
difficulties raised by vagueness have been shown to affect straightforward rea-
soning steps like inferring conjunctions from their conjuncts or vice versa. Such
healthy and blameless babies should not be thrown out simply in order to be
rid of a spoonful of bathwater.
Still, fuzzy logic seems to have raised one valuable insight. There is a need
for some concept of degree in the semantic theory, even if it should not be
construed as numerical degree. And the diagnosis of the sorites problem is
fundamentally right: trivially small removals from the absolute truth can ac-
cumulate as premises are applied to one another until the total aberration is
far from trivial. The next pressing need, then, is to re-work the logic more
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carefully, preserving the insights and the ability to meet Dummett’s challenge
while avoiding the absurdities of the old fuzzy logic. The place to begin is in
proof theory.
3 T L F
The place to begin in proof theory is with natural deduction. The system F
(for “fuzzy”) to be laid out here as a labelled deductive system is adapted from
[13], to which reference should be made for more detailed explanation and
motivation of the key ideas. As pointed out in [13], this way of formulating
nonclassical logics is not new. To the list of precursors given there I would add
Meyer’s [7].
The objects with which the logic deals are labelled formulae (in fact, rep-
resenting sequents in a fairly transparent way). These are ordered pairs each
consisting of a structured identifier called its label and a single formula. An
assumption is an object of the form
LA : A
where LA is the label identifying formula A. This corresponds to the sequent
A ` A
and may be introduced into any proof at any point. The rest of the rules, for
introducing and eliminating logical constants, serve to transform such trivially
valid sequents into nontrivially valid ones. As each assumption is made, the
formula introduced will be given a short label: if we have occasion to write out
proofs, we shall use numerals for this purpose, though the reader who feels that
Greek letters or the like would look “more logical” is free to make substitutions
to taste.
There are two differences between this account of system F and the corre-
sponding labelled classical logic. The first is that negation in F is like that of
intuitionist logic, so it lacks the classical rule of double negation elimination.
The second is that, as in [13], we distinguish between two ways in which labels
may be combined. Building on the insight won by the fuzzy logicians we al-
low ourselves to collect assumptions into sets just as classically, or into multisets.
As presaged above, we should expect the premises of a sorites argument, and
indeed those of modus ponens generally, to come in a multiset, while those of
a purely extensional inference like adjunction would more naturally come in a
set.
Because of the need to distinguish sets from multisets, we shall require
two notations for the combination of labels. Each label represents a bunch of
formulae, which may be either a set or a multiset of smaller bunches. For set
union we use the comma ‘,’ and for multiset union the semicolon ‘;’. The two
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operations for combining labels may be nested inside each other to any finite
depth, so we shall sometimes need to use parentheses in the normal way to
disambiguate compounds. The notation
Γ(X)
stands for a label in which X occurs as a sub-label. Then
Γ(Y)
stands for the result of substituting label Y for that distinguished occurrence
of X.
The rule for introducing assumptions has already been given. There are
also structural rules. First there is a rule of weakening or thinning. If a con-
clusion follows from some of our assumptions then we take that as sufficient
for it to follow from the whole bunch of them. Inference from a database, for
example, is like that: in judging that a statement true given the data we do not
require that every single piece of data have been used in its derivation. So we
expect and get the rule K:
Γ(X) : A
Γ(∆(X)) : A
Then there are further structural rules due to the combinatory properties of set
and multiset union. Both operations are associative and commutative, giving
rules B:
Γ((X, Y), Z) : A
Γ(X, (Y, Z)) : A
Γ((X; Y);Z) : A
Γ(X; (Y;Z)) : A
and C:
Γ(X, Y) : A
Γ(Y, X) : A
Γ(X; Y) : A
Γ(Y;X) : A
Set union is idempotent, but multiset union is not, so there is a rule W of
contraction for labels combined with commas but not for those combined with
semicolons:
Γ(X,X) : A
Γ(X) : A
The logical rules giving the meanings of connectives and the like are much
as expected, given the attention we are paying to the two modes of combina-
tion. Conjunction, as usual, is straightforward:
X : A Y : B
∧I
X, Y : A ∧ B
X : A ∧ B
∧E
X : A
X : A ∧ B
∧E
X : B
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Note that conjunction, as befits this most extensional of connectives, goes with
set combination. Disjunction is marginally more complicated because we are
working in a right-handed system. The rules are:
X : A
∨I
X : A ∨ B
X : B
∨I
X : A ∨ B
X : A ∨ B Γ(LA) : C Γ(LB) : C
∨E
Γ(X) : C
The reasoning of ∨E is that if there is some rôle as premise, Γ(ξ), which can
be played indifferently by A or by B then it can be played by their disjunction
or by anything X which entails their disjunction. Thus the logic of conjunction
and disjunction is very standard.
The operation of implication forms a kind of logical conditional from its
antecedent and its consequent. Such a conditional is a consequence of as-
sumptions if and only if the addition of the antecedent to those assumptions
would enable the consequent to be derived. Thus for instance ‘All logicians are
underpaid’ entails ‘If McRobbie is a logician then McRobbie is underpaid’ be-
cause by applying ‘All logicians are underpaid’ to the additional assumption that
McRobbie is a logician we can logically deduce that McRobbie is underpaid.
The putting together of major and minor premises here is multiset putting to-
gether, for they are interacting, the one being applied to the other, to produce
the conclusion.9 Hence the natural rules for the introduction and elimination
of implication are:
X;LA : B
→I
X : A→B
X : A→B Y : A
→E
X; Y : B
Modus ponens, being the form of →E corresponding straightforwardly to →I on
the above motivating remarks, is indeed fundamental to the present account
of conditionals as Dummett’s challenge requires.
Negation is intuitionistic. The neatest way to incorporate it is to define it
in terms of an absurd constant ⊥:
∼ A =df A→⊥
Then the only negation principle required is the absurdity rule:
X : ⊥
⊥E
X : A
9For a more extended discussion of this point see [13, 14].
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The rules for quantifiers are rather like those of classical or intuitionistic
free logic, because they need to account for the fact that some of the objects
quantified over may exist only at lax degrees of truth. Therefore there is a
primitive existence predicate E! with the reading that E!t is true to the degree
that t denotes something.
As well as E!, the language is taken to have the usual apparatus of variables
and function symbols, from which are constructed terms. The story about
freedom and bondage is the normal one. In specifying the rules, we use the
notation
Atv
to stand for the result of substituting term t for all and only free occurrences
of variable v in formula A. The rules are:
X : A where v does not
∀I occur free in X
X : ∀vA
X : ∀vA Y : E!t where t is free
∀E for v in A
X; Y : Atv
X : Atv Y : E!t where t is free∃I for v in A
X; Y : ∃vA
X : ∃vA Γ(LA) : B where v does not∃E occur free in Γ(B)
Γ(X) : B
In addition, it is axiomatic that everything exists:
∅ : E!v
Here is a sample proof just to show what proofs look like:
1 : p→q 3 : p 2 : p→r 3 : p
→E →E
1; 3 : q 2; 3 : r
∧I
(1; 3), (2; 3) : q ∧ r
K (×2)
(1; 2; 3), (1; 2; 3) : q ∧ r
W
1; 2; 3 : q ∧ r
→I
1; 2 : p→(q ∧ r)
→I
1 : (p→r)→(p→(q ∧ r))
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The structural K and W moves in the middle of this proof bear closer
inspection. The two applications of K are necessary in order to unify the two
parenthesised sublabels so that W can apply. Of course, if we were to use
this formulation of logic F in real applications, these low-level appeals to the
“algebra of labels” would be elided for conciseness and readability.
As noted, contraction for ‘;’ is not available, as multiset union is not idem-
potent. Intensional contraction is essential to the classical proofs of all of the
following sequents, none of which is provable in F:
p→(p→q) ` p→q
p, p→q ` q
p→q, q→r ` p→r
p, ∼ q ` ∼ (p→q)
p→ ∼ p ` ∼ p
` ∼ (p ∧ ∼ p)
∀x E!fx; ∀x (Fx→Ffx) ` ∀x (Fx→Fffx)
The last of these is especially pertinent to the sorites argument, for it is the
form of the inference from ‘One step preserves F’ to ‘Two steps preserve F’.
The second, third and fourth on the above list of F-invalid sequents crucially
have commas rather than semicolons on the left. The analogous sequents with
semicolons are all easily provable.
4 S
To deepen the explanation of system F we now turn to semantics, the object
being to relate the logic to intuitively graspable structures and distinctions.
What follows is a modelling in the style of Kripke’s semantics for intuition-
ist logic. Just as intuitionists generally feel that the classical realist “possible
worlds” story, even if read in terms of “states of information” or some such,
misrepresents them, so F supporters (when eventually there are such things)
will probably hold the present paper to be an example of how not to approach
their position. Well, let that be. For the moment our problem is to get some
semantic grip on F, in our own heathen tongue if necessary. Such an exercise
can at least give us information about the system: for example, it is a way of
finding out which are the F-valid inferences.
We first model the propositional fragment of F, since most differences be-
tween our logic and the standard brands can be isolated at the propositional
level where the model structures are relatively simple. The basis is a set D of
“degrees to which the truth could be stretched”. These might well be individu-
ated by reference to statements which they make true (“. . .just enough to make
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it true that R(50)”, etc.). We then need a relation > between members of D
and multisets of members of D. Where M is a multiset of degrees and d is a
particular degree we write
d > M
to indicate that d stretches the truth as far as all the members of M put to-
gether. The idea of putting together, of course, is inherited from the syntactic
concept of applying one assumption or piece of information to another as hap-
pens in uses of modus ponens. The degrees are put together in multisets rather
than just in sets because for this purpose repetitions count: as we have seen,
the results of applying a premise to itself need not be the same as those of
taking that premise on its own.
Before going further, it is worthwhile to define a relation of weak compat-
ibility:
d e =df ∃x (x > [d, e])
So d and e are weakly compatible iff it would not be totally absurd to put them
together. The structure then satisfies the postulates10
p1. d > [d]
p2. d > M unionsqN ⇒ d > M
p3. e > N unionsq [d], d > M ⇒ e > N unionsqM
p4. d > M unionsqN ⇒ ∃e(e > M)∃f(f > N) d > [e, f]
Postulates p1 and p2 should be fairly obvious given the intended reading. Pos-
tulate p3 makes the ordering relation appropriately transitive and monotonic.
Postulate p4 is harder to see intuitively. It says in effect that every partition
of a multiset (into parts M and N) is “witnessed” by a pair of degrees (e and f).
The claim that every multiset M stretches the truth to a particular degree δM
∀d (d > [δM] ⇔ d > M)
would allow p4 to be simplified to
p4+. δMunionsqN > [δM, δN]
This, however, would be properly stronger than p4; the weaker version is suffi-
cient for the completeness proof below. In what follows the structure
〈D, > 〉
shall be known as an F frame.
10Notation for multisets is like that for sets, but square. So a multiset may be given in ex-
tension by listing betwen square brackets, and multiset intersection and union are written with
square cap and cup respectively. When being careful, we may distinguish between the null set ∅
and the null multiset 2/ .
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It is not part of the definition of an F frame that there should exist a zero
degree of stretch, or absolute truth. A frame is said to be with zero iff it contains
a degree 0 such that
∀dd > [0]
From the formal point of view, absolute truth is an optional extra, since the
presence or absence of a zero does not affect the stock of theorems or validated
inferences.
An interpretation is a function I assigning to each atomic formula a subset
of D such that for any atom A and any e > [d]
d ∈ I(A) ⇒ e ∈ I(A)
We write
d |=
I
A
to mean that degree d of stretching would suffice to make formula A true for
interpretation I. In what follows the subscript will be omitted for clarity.
The recursive clauses giving the meanings of connectives are:
1. d |= pk ⇐⇒ d ∈ I(pk)
2. d |= A ∧ B ⇐⇒ d |= A and d |= B
3. d |= A ∨ B ⇐⇒ d |= A or d |= B
4. d |= A→B ⇐⇒ ∀e (e|=A) ∀f(f > [d,e]) f |= B
5. d |= ∼ A ⇐⇒ ∀e (de) e 6|= A
This definition of the relation |= extends in a natural way from formulae to
bunches of formulae. A degree realises a set of bunches iff it realises every mem-
ber of that set, and where B is a multiset of bunches d |= B iff d > M for some
multiset M of degrees where there is a one-one mapping µ of B onto M such
that for all X in B, µ(X) |= X.
Clauses 4 and 5 need comment. Clause 4 reflects the reading given to the
conditional when motivating the natural deduction system. What it is for d to
yield ‘IfA then B’ just is that by putting it together with any ewhich yieldsAwe
can get B. How much more clearly could modus ponens be made constitutive of
the meaning of ‘if ’? Clause 5 results from clause 4 on the definition of negation
as implying absurdity. To be in a position to deny A is not just to fail to be in a
position to assert A, for we want the possibility of becoming more generous as
to what counts as assertible without thereby contradicting ourselves.
Formula A is said to be true for I iff for every degree d, d |=
I
A. It is valid iff
true for every interpretation. Sequent 〈X,A〉 is valid iff on every interpretation,
for every degree d, if d |= X then d |= A. Soundness and completeness theo-
rems for the propositional logic F are fairly straightforward.11 In a frame with
11See the next section for these and other proofs. See [3] or [2] for the general technique of
such completeness proofs. The notion of an F frame given in the present paper is adapted from
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zero, of course, truth for an interpretation is just a matter of holding at degree
0. Extension of the story to deal with quantifiers is less simple, but interesting,
as will be explained below after some exploration of the propositional logic.
The account of the sorites inference is much as expected. Assertibility in
the ordinary sense is a vague notion: there will be a fuzzy set of “small de-
grees of stretch” rather close to absolute truth with the property that anything
true to such a degree is ordinarily assertible: criticism of one who asserted it
would be misplaced, for instance. All of the premises of the sorites hold at
some points d corresponding to degrees like that, but the conclusion does not
because holding-at-a-point is not closed under detachment. The real modus po-
nens is built into the modelling condition for → (condition 4 above), meeting
Dummett’s challenge head-on.
The above semantic account is designed to keep what is valuable in the
Łukasiewicz approach while rejecting the dross. The idea of letting the degrees
of departure from truth accumulate in step with the application of assump-
tions is retained, as is the distinction between the real and the pseudo modus
ponens. Total order and specifically arithmetical properties are however aban-
doned. Moreover the logic F, unlike the Łukasiewicz system, is deduction-
theoretically natural. It also has characteristics which make possible a novel
approach to the problems of higher order vagueness, but to approach these we
need some metatheorems.
5 C   
The main result of this section is that exactly the same sequents are valid in F
frames as are provable in F as formulated above, justifying the nomenclature.
Firstly we add to the language an intensional conjunction connective ◦ 12
subject to the introduction and elimination rules
X : A Y : B
◦I
X; Y : A ◦ B
X : A ◦ B Γ(LA;LB) : C ◦E
Γ(X) : C
Secondly we give a more formal definition of a “bunch" of formulae. Bunches
are of two kinds: S-bunches and M-bunches as follows.
the work of Routley, Meyer and others on Kripke models for the relevant logics. The fact that
their three-place relation can be used to give semantics for fuzzy logics of the Łukasiewicz type
has often been noted, first perhaps by Lakoff in [6]. It may be worth pointing out that F is not
in any sense a relevant logic, as P `F Q→P.
12This connective is known in linear logic as “tensor product” and in the relevant logic liter-
ature as “fusion", as it “fuses" its conjuncts into a new object which does not easily decompose
back into them. It has algebraically natural properties such as associativity and commutativity,
making it easier to handle semantically than the implication connective.
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1. A formula is both an S-bunch and an M-bunch.
2. Any set of M-bunches is an S-bunch.
3. Any multiset of S-bunches is an M-bunch.
4. Nothing is a bunch except by finitely many applications of the above
clauses.
Let β be a bunch. If β is an M-bunch, define βs as {β}; otherwise let βs be β.
Conversely, if β is any S-bunch, let βm be defined as [β]; otherwise let βm be
β.
Next we define what it is for a finite sequent to be provable. A sequent is
an ordered pair consisting of a bunch of formulae (its antecedents) and a single
formula (its succedent). By a labelling scheme we mean an assignment to each
formula A of a label LA. A derivation under a labelling scheme is one in which
each axiom (assumption) is a formula labelled according to the scheme. Then
each molecular label σ corresponds to a bunch of formulae B(σ):
1. Where A is a formula, B(LA) = A
2. B(X, Y) = B(X)s ∪B(Y)s
3. B(X; Y) = B(X)m unionsqB(Y)m
Although the function B is not one-one, it may be inverted in a sense. For
any finite bunch X we may choose as B ′(X) the first label L in some sensible
order (e.g. lexicographic order) such that B(L) = X. A finite sequent 〈β,A〉 is
provable iff under every labelling scheme there is a derivation of the labelled
formula B ′(β) : A.
To define what it is for an infinite sequent to be provable, we introduce the
notion of a finitisation of a given bunch and of a sequent.
1. Any formula is a finitisation of itself.
2. Where X1 . . . Xn are finitisations of Y1 . . . Yn and {Y1 . . . Yn} ∪ Z is an S-
bunch, {X1 . . . Xn} is a finitisation of {Y1 . . . Yn} ∪ Z.
3. Where X1 . . . Xn are finitisations of Y1 . . . Yn and [Y1 . . . Yn] unionsq Z is an M-
bunch, [X1 . . . Xn] is a finitisation of [Y1 . . . Yn] unionsq Z.
4. Sequent 〈β,A〉 is a finitisation of sequent 〈β ′, A〉 iff β is a finitisation of
β ′.
5. Nothing is a finitisation except as a consequence of this definition.
In other words, the finitisations of a sequent are those finite sequents which
can be converted into it by (possibly repeated and possibly infinitary) applica-
tions of weakening. Then we say that a sequent is provable just in case some
finitisation of it is provable.
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We next define for each finite bunch X of formulae the characteristic for-
mula X? as follows.13
1. Where A is a formula, A? is A.
2. {X1 . . . Xn}? is X?1 ∧ . . . ∧ X?n.
3. [X1 . . . Xn]? is X?1 ◦ . . . ◦ X?n.
Evidently the finite sequent 〈X,A〉 is provable iff 〈X?, A〉 is provable, which is
the case iff B ′(X) : A is obtainable by a derivation whose assumptions LB : B
all use unstructured (atomic) labels, and iff X?→A is a theorem of F (provable
with the null label). Evidently also, if Y is a finitisation of X then
X ` Y?
Next we define the canonical truth set T. No atomic formula is in T, and:
A ∧ B ∈ T ⇐⇒ A ∈ T and B ∈ T
A ◦ B ∈ T ⇐⇒ A ∈ T and B ∈ T
A ∨ B ∈ T ⇐⇒ A ∈ T or B ∈ T
∼ A ∈ T ⇐⇒ ` ∼ A and A /∈ T
A→B ∈ T ⇐⇒ A ` B and if A ∈ T then B ∈ T
The turnstile represents provability in F.
 4 If A→B ∈ T then Γ(A)?→Γ(B)? ∈ T.
For proof, suppose A→B ∈ T. Clearly if Γ(A)? ∈ T then each formula
in Γ(A) is in T, so each formula in Γ(B) is in T, so Γ(B)? ∈ T. The proof is
therefore completed by a quick induction on the complexity of Γ showing that
if A→B is a theorem of F then so is Γ(A)?→Γ(B)?. This is left to the reader.
 5 If Γ(A ∨ B)? ∈ T then either Γ(A)? ∈ T or Γ(B)? ∈ T.
Proof: Another induction on the complexity of Γ . In the base case Γ(A) is A
and there is nothing to prove. One of the induction cases is Γ(A) = ∆(A), X. If
Γ(A ∨ B)? ∈ T then ∆(A ∨ B)? ∈ T and X? ∈ T. But ∆ is less complex than Γ ,
so either ∆(A)? ∈ T or ∆(B)? ∈ T, so either ∆(A)? ∧ X? ∈ T or ∆(B)? ∧ X? ∈ T
as required. The other induction cases are similar.
 6 (Metacompleteness) ` A ⇐⇒ A ∈ T.
Equivalently, for finite X, X ` A ⇐⇒ X?→A ∈ T
13We suppose that the multi-ary conjunctions are to be read sensibly: say, with the conjuncts
in lexicographic order and associated to the left.
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Proof: Proof is by induction in both directions. Right to left is an induction on
the complexity of A and is trivial. Left to right is an induction on the length
of proofs in F. The base case is a derivation of length 1, where X?→A is just
A→A which is clearly in T. The induction step is very case-ridden as each rule
has to be verified. The case of ∨E is hardest and will serve as an illustration.
Suppose
X?→ A ∨ B
Γ(A)?→ C
Γ(B)?→ C
are all in T. Clearly if either Γ(A)? or Γ(B)? is in T then C is in T, so by
lemma 5 if Γ(A ∨ B)? is in T then so is C. Clearly Γ(A ∨ B)? ` C. There-
fore Γ(A ∨ B)?→C ∈ T. By lemma 4 therefore Γ(X)?→C ∈ T. The rest of
the cases are similar but easier and are left as another exercise.
 7 For any formulaeA and B, if ` A ∨ B then either ` A or ` B.
Proof: by inspection of theorem 6 and the definition of T.
By an F-theory we understand a set of formulae closed under F entailment.
Theory θ is prime iff whenever it contains a disjunction it contains at least one
of the disjuncts, detached iff closed under the pseudo modus ponens inference
{A→B,A} =⇒ B
and normal if both prime and detached. Clearly the set F of theorems of F
itself is a normal F-theory. We expect that the world (everything that is the
case) is another. We do not expect all theories to be normal: most scientific
theories for example are not prime, and the set of sentences assertible to some
given high degree, though a theory, is not detached. Still, prime theories are
the ones that give the extensional connectives their full truth functional due,
and detached ones do the same for intensional connectives, so as logicians we
take such theories to be of the most formal interest.
Where Σ is a bunch of formulae and θ is any set of formulae we define the
θ closure of Σ by
Cθ(Σ) = {A : Σ; θ ` A}
Clearly an equivalent condition would be
Cθ(Σ) = {B : ∃A(Σ `A) (θ `A→B)}
Note also that CF(Σ) is just C∅(Σ), the set of logical consequences of Σ. For any
set σ of formulae and multiset Σ of sets of formulae we define ‘σ is as strong as
Σ given θ’ by
σ >θ Σ =df Cθ(Σ) ⊆ σ
A set σ is said to be a θ-theory iff σ = Cθ([σ]).
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 8 Let θ be any normal F-theory. Let Π be the set of prime θ-theories. Then
〈Π, > θ〉 is an F frame with zero θ.
Proof: Proof is a matter of checking the postulates. The cases of p1 and p2 are
trivial. Postulate p3 needs a bit of work. Let Σ and Θ be multisets of prime
θ-theories. By the definition of logical consequence,the multiset union Σ unionsq Θ
entails A iff for some finitisation φ of Θ, Σ unionsq [φ?] entails A. But φ? ∈ CF(Θ),
so by weakening, Σ unionsq [CF(Θ)] entails A. That is to say
CF(Σ unionsqΘ) ⊆ CF(Σ ∪ [CF(Θ)])
By the unpacking of definitions this fact extends from CF to Cθ. Consequently
if Cθ(Θ) ⊆ σ and Cθ(Σunionsq [σ]) ⊆ pi then Cθ(ΣunionsqΘ) ⊆ pi which is to say p3. For p4
we use Zorn’s lemma. Suppose
pi > θ Σ unionsqΘ
where pi is a prime θ-theory and Σ and Θ are multisets of such. Then clearly
pi > θ [Cθ(Σ),Cθ(Θ)]
Chains of theories are bounded above by their unions, and if the union of a
chain of theories features as a sub-bunch on the left of a provable sequent then
it can be replaced there by some member of the chain because, consequence
being compact, the sequent can be finitised. Let α be a maximal super-θ-theory
of Cθ(Σ) such that
pi > θ [α,Cθ(Θ)]
as guaranteed by Zorn’s lemma. Similarly, let β be a maximal super-θ-theory of
Cθ(Θ) such that
pi > θ [α,β]
It is quite easy to check that α and β are prime, for suppose neither A nor B is
in α. By its maximality,
(α,A);Cθ(Θ); θ ` C
(α,B);Cθ(Θ); θ ` D
for some C and D neither of which is in pi. By the primeness of pi, C ∨ D is not
in pi either. But by ∨I and ∨E
(α,A ∨ B);Cθ(Θ); θ ` C ∨ D
whence A ∨ B is not in α. The argument that β is prime is similar.
 9 (Squeeze) Let θ be a set of formulae. For any θ-theory α and for any formu-
lae A and B, if A→B /∈ α then there exist prime θ-theories β and γ with A ∈ β and
B /∈ γ such that Cθ([α,β]) ⊆ γ.
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Proof: let α be a θ-theory not containing A→B. Define β0 as Cθ({A}). Note
that B /∈ Cθ([α,β0]) since otherwise θ;α;A ` B, whence A→B ∈ α contrary
to the supposition. Use Zorn’s lemma to choose a maximal θ-theory β such
that β0 ⊆ β and B /∈ Cθ([α,β]). Then β is prime, for let C and D be formulae
not in β. Then
θ;α; (β,C) ` B
θ;α; (β,D) ` B
Hence by ∨E
θ;α; (β,C ∨ D) ` B
whence C ∨ D /∈ β. Use Zorn’s lemma again to deliver a maximal supertheory
γ of Cα(β) not containing B. By a similar argument, γ is again prime, so β and
γ suffice for the lemma.
 10 Let θ be a normal F-theory. Let the canonical θ frame be defined as in
theorem 8. For each atomic formula pk let I(pk) be the set of prime θ-theories containing
pk. Then for every formulaA and for every degree d in the frame, d |=IA iffA ∈ d.
Proof: Proof by induction on the construction of A. The only case presenting
any problem is A = B→C, which is cleared up by the squeeze lemma.
Theorem 10 suffices to show the completeness ofF for validity inF frames,
for as noted the set F is a normal theory whence the canonical model to which
it gives rise falsifies all nontheorems together and provides for every invalid
sequent X : A a degree d such that d |= X but d 6|= A. The converse soundness
theorem is proved by (tedious) induction over the length of proofs which is left
to the reader.
6 R
The canonical frame
〈Π, > ∅〉
and the canonical interpretation in it for which for all θ and A
θ |= A ⇐⇒ A ∈ θ
in some sense constitute the intended model of the logic F. Let is call them
the Lindenbaum frame and the Lindenbaum model since they correspond to the
Lindenbaum algebra obtained as the quotient algebra under the congruence re-
lation of provable equivalence on the algebra of formulae. In the Lindenbaum
model there is no higher-order vagueness: every proposition has its value ex-
actly, for in effect every proposition takes itself, or its logical equivalence class,
as value. So higher order imprecision stops somewhere, the Lindenbaum model
giving an upper bound on where it stops. There is no vagueness in the matter of
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whether one thing logically entails another, however vague those things them-
selves may be. Hence we can model the logic of imprecise discourse precisely
without falling foul of the meta-sorites arguments and without doing the least
violence to the facts.
It is a very special feature of logics like our system F that the Lindenbaum
frame is a frame in the fullest sense. The same picture cannot be drawn with
respect to the Łukasiewicz continuum-valued logic, for instance, for in such
cases there is no analogue of theorem 6 and corollary 7. The set of theorems of
Łukasiewicz’s logic is not a normal theory for it fails to be prime. For example,
(P→Q) ∨ (Q→P)
is a theorem though of course neither disjunct is. Thus by re-working fuzzy
logic as F not only have we secured a formulation deserving the title of natural
deduction (and even better proof-theoretic properties, for which see below)
but we have the makings of a solution to one of the hardest problems in the
field, that of marrying lower-order vagueness with higher-order precision.
There is, however, a price to be paid for such a neat escape from such a
traditionally stubborn difficulty. In the Lindenbaum model the truths—those
propositions which hold at the zero world—are just the logical truths. And in
reality we hardly expect the logical truths to be the only truths. It is good that
there should be models verifying no contingent truths, so that pure logic is
not required to claim that there are truths beyond logic; but of course there
should also be models looking like reality, in which there are many truths of
other sorts. We therefore expect that the world will consist of more than logic,
though we do not expect logic itself to tell us what more there is to the truth.
A couple of formal facts are of some help in making the semantics of F into a
more adequate account.
 11 Let S be any set of atomic formulae. Then there is a model in which
the true atomic formulae are exactly those in S.
Proof: Fact 11 is trivial, as it is for classical logic and for any other sensible
system: in the Lindenbaum frame, let I(p) be {0} if p ∈ S and ∅ otherwise.
This is a rather meagre step albeit in the right direction, as the Lindenbaum
frame still draws more distinctions than we really want. In that frame the
“degrees" are just all the prime theories, whereas we should like the degree
structure too to be largely a function of what is the case rather than something
dictated simply by logic itself. For another small step in the right direction,
then:
 12 Suppose A is not deducible from set S of atomic formulae by means
of logical entailment and detachment. Then there is a model in which for any
atomic P, 0 |= P ⇐⇒ P ∈ S but 0 6|= A and in which for all degrees d and e if
e 6> d then there is some B such that d |= B but B 6∈ CS({C : e |= C}).
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Proof: For proof, let θ be the closure of CF(S) under detachment. Clearly θ is a
detached theory whose atomic theorems are exactly the members of S. Then
re-work the proof of theorem 6 above, using Tθ in place of T. Tθ is defined
like T except that atoms are in it iff they are in θ and the deducibility parts of
the negation and implication clauses are re-written as θ ` ∼ A and θ;A ` B
respectively. The upshot is that Tθ is identical with θ, and so is a normal theory
agreeing with S on atoms. Theorem 10 then delivers the result.
In the light of this we are assured of a model in which the true atomic sen-
tences are just those free of any vagueness which would be accounted true by
a classical (or perhaps an intuitionistic) truth-theorist. Moreover, there are no
“degrees" in its frame except for those needed to make distinctions between
formulae not equivalent given those atoms. We can do even better, using Zorn’s
lemma to beef up an arbitrary theory to a maximal (hence prime) supertheory
still avoiding a given nontheorem and then cutting back in the manner of fact
12 to give an intuitively “large" normal theory on which can be based a frame.
Firm technical results on the availability of truth-like frames are somewhat
elusive, however.
It is worth pausing here to note the possibility of strengtheningF by adding
the “double negation elimination”:
X : ∼ ∼ A
DNE
X : A
This gives a system I shall dub F*. It is shown in [10] that theorem 6 goes
through for F* though in a slightly more complicated form because of the
non-constructive account of negation. Semantics forF*may be obtained easily
from those forF by adding Sylvan’s star operation to frames as in [3], re-writing
the evaluation clause for negation
d |= ∼ A ⇐⇒ d∗ 6|= A
as usual.
The logic F**, otherwise known as the “logic of constructible falsity” [8],
is a proper supersystem of F* with delightfully simple semantics. A frame for
F** is just a partially ordered set of “degrees". At each degree, each formula
may be true, false or neither. All values (true or false) are inherited by stronger
degrees. We may let V(A,d) be the value (if any) of A at d. The interpretation
conditions for connectives are as follows.
V(A ∧ B, d) = T ⇐⇒ V(A,d) = T and V(B, d) = T
V(A ∧ B, d) = F ⇐⇒ V(A,d) = F or V(B, d) = F
V(A ∨ B, d) = T ⇐⇒ V(A,d) = T or V(B, d) = T
V(A ∨ B, d) = F ⇐⇒ V(A,d) = F and V(B, d) = F
V( ∼ A,d) = T ⇐⇒ V(A,d) = F
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V( ∼ A,d) = F ⇐⇒ V(A,d) = T
V(A→B, d) = T ⇐⇒ for all e such that e > d,
if V(A, e) = T then V(B, e) = T and
if V(B, e) = F then V(A, e) = F
V(A→B, d) = F ⇐⇒ V(A,d) = T and V(B, d) = F
It was once conjectured that F** = F* but this turned out to have been a vain
hope.14 The formula
P◦Q→ .P◦P◦Q ∨ P◦Q◦Q
is valid in F** but is not a theorem of F*. In fact, its addition to F* suffices
to axiomatise F**. The investigation of F* and F** lies beyond the scope of
the present paper; for now it suffices to say that they represent logical points
of view close to that associated with F and could be made the focus of a less
anti-realist account of reasoning with vagueness.
7 F  
We now turn from the propositional fragment of F to the full logic including
quantification theory. The introduction and elimination rules for quantifiers
were given earlier along with those for the connectives, but so far we have not
considered semantics for the predicate logic. In fact, the necessary amend-
ments to the propositional semantics are very much what might be expected
given the intuitionistic cast of F.
A frame is what it was before, with the addition of a function E assigning to
each d in D a nonempty set of objects Ed forming its domain of quantification.
Where e > [d], we allow that there may be objects in Ee which are not in Ed,
since the criteria for existence may be relaxed along with those for truth as we
move from d to e. That is, there is an extra heredity postulate for domains:
p5. e > [d] ⇒ Ed ⊆ Ee
An interpretation is now a more complicated function assigning values at de-
grees to function and predicate symbols again subject to the heredity condi-
tion. A function symbol is assigned at each degree a partial function on the
domain of that degree, and a predicate symbol is assigned a relation defined on
the domain. That is:
Id(f
n
k ) : Σ −→ Ed for some Σ ⊆ (Ed)n
Id(F
n
k ) ⊆ (Ed)n
Moreover, interpretation is hereditary with respect to the partial order of
strength between degrees:
14For this observation I am indebted to Tim Surendonk.
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e > [d] ⇒ Id(fnk ) ⊆ Ie(fnk )
e > [d] ⇒ Id(Fnk ) ⊆ Ie(Fnk )
On the basis of this we may define denotation δId for terms:
δId(v) ∈ E(d)
δId(f
n
k t1 . . . tn) = Id(f
n
k )
(
δId(t1) . . . δ
I
d(tn)
)
So a term either fails to denote for a given degree or it denotes an individual
from the domain of that degree, and continues to denote the same individual
for all stronger degrees. The new base clause for the inductive definition of
realisation reads:
1. d |= Fnk t1 . . . tn ⇐⇒ 〈δId(t1) . . . δId(tn)〉 ∈ Id(Fnk )
and it is necessary to add two new clauses to deal with the quantifiers. For
these, as usual let a v-variant of interpretation I be any interpretation differing
from I at most in the values it assigns (at degrees) to variable v. Then
6. d |=I ∀vA⇐⇒ for every v-variant I′ of I,
for every e such that e > [d], e |=I′ A
7. d |=I ∃vA⇐⇒ for some v-variant I′ of I, d |=I′ A
Sequent X : A is valid iff for every interpretation I in every frame, for every
degree d:
d |=I X ⇒ d |=IA
Our next aim is to prove first order F sound and complete for quantifica-
tional F frames as just defined. The key to the soundness proof is a heredity
lemma.
 13 (Heredity) In any interpretation I, for any degrees d and e and for any
formulaA, if e > [d] and d |=IA then e |=IA.
Proof: Proof is by induction on the complexity of A and is perfectly straight-
forward. In the base case A is atomic. Since values of everything subatomic
are by stipulation inherited, this case is trivial. The induction cases A = ∼ B
and A = ∀vB are also trivial, and the conjunction and disjunction cases pose
no real problem. Where A = ∃vB, if d |=IA then there is some a-variant I′
of I such that d |=I′ Bav . On induction hypothesis therefore e |=I′ Bav whence
e |=IA. The remaining case is that in which A is B→C. Suppose so, and that
d |=
I
A. Then suppose f |=I B and g > [e, f]. By p3, g > [d, f], so g |=IC. That
is, e |=IA.
 14 (Soundness) Every first order sequent provable in F is valid in quan-
tificational F frames.
Proof: Proof is by induction on the length of proofs in F and is omitted here
as none of the many cases is particularly interesting.
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The completeness theorem is proved much as in the propositional case,
with the usual complications to take care of quantifiers. The metacomplete-
ness theorem continues to hold, for closed formulae, with the extra clauses on
the canonical truth set T:
∀vA ∈ T ⇐⇒ ` ∀vA and for every closed term t, Atv ∈ T
∃vA ∈ T ⇐⇒ Atv ∈ T for some closed term t
As before, this enables the Lindenbaum model of the logic to be used to re-
fute all nontheorems together. The theories which correspond to degrees are
of course those which are not only prime but also saturated in that whenever
they contain an existential formula they also contain a ground instance of it.
Hence in constructing such theories for the priming and squeeze lemmas, care
must be taken to add instances of any existential formulae included. Verifica-
tion of the postulates is fairly straightforward, except for the witness postulate
p4. The problem here is that we need to be assured that in “beefing up” the
witnesses into prime and saturated theories e and f, the instances of existen-
tials which get added can all be chosen so as not to destroy the condition that
if [e, f] ` A then A ∈ d. The fact that so assures us is the pair of confinement
laws
A ∧ ∃vB ` ∃v(A ∧ B)
A ◦ ∃vB ` ∃v(A ◦ B)
where v does not occur free in A. Then for instance when we have multisets X
and Y of theories and a saturated theory d such that CF(XunionsqY) ⊆ d and we wish
to extend CF(Y) to a prime and saturated theory f such that CF(X unionsq [f]) ⊆ d,
any existential in f may be instantiated by some term which instantiates it in
d. Without going into further detail, therefore, we announce
 15 (Completeness) Every first order sequent which is valid in quantifica-
tional F frames is provable in F.
Having a fully articulated formal modelling of the logic of vague expres-
sions makes it possible to clarify certain philosophical questions. For exam-
ple, there has been much discussion in the recent literature of the question of
whether, and in what sense, there might be vague objects as opposed to vague
predicates. It seems that several non-equivalent cases need to be distinguished.
One way in which an object might be vague is in the possession of blurred
or imprecise boundaries. This, after all, was Frege’s original paradigm case of
vagueness: an area which shades off gradually into its surroundings like a pho-
tographic image out of focus. Clearly there are lots of vague objects in this
sense. Clouds and crowds come to mind immediately. Or think of the Sahara
desert, or the Thames estuary. In such cases it is a vague matter which smaller
items are parts of the object. At a sufficiently microscopic level, even physi-
cal objects of the table-and-chair variety are like this. In terms of the opening
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examples, we find vague objects of this sort if we are prepared to count my
childhood (i.e. that stretch of time during which I was a child) or the red part
of the Dummett strip as an object.
A more radical notion is that of an object whose existence is vague, which
exists only to a degree. Observe that the semantic picture sketched for system
F allows for objects vague in this sense too, as domains may increase in size as
we become more lax as to what counts as true. What sort of object could be
vague in this sense? Presumably one whose existence depends on its being of
a certain kind. Thousands of years ago there was fertile grassland where the
Sahara now is; at that time the Sahara did not exist. The difficulty of picking
a time at which it came into existence is not merely epistemological but is
due to the fact that it exists only insofar as it is a desert, and the predicate
‘. . .is a desert’ is a vague one. An object could be vague in this sense without
having vague boundaries. A crowd might be bounded by the walls of a room,
for example, and yet its existence (“qua crowd", we like to say) supervenes on
the spatial arrangement of persons, so it depends on whether so few people so
disposed in such a space counts as a crowd.
Most of the recent discussion of vague objects has focussed on the ques-
tion of whether identity statements, presumably using proper names for such
objects, can be vague.15 The logic of identity has not been incorporated into F
as formulated above, but clearly it can be, and there is some choice as to the
postulates. Several types of “vague identity statements” might then be distin-
guished. Firstly, where n denotes an object whose existence is vague as in the
second sense above, the sentence
n = n
will be realised only by degrees for which that object exists and so will be vague.
Secondly, there may be terms which fail to denote at some points and come to
denote at some others. They may do this even if the objects they denote are
already in the domains of the former points. So for example an object may
exist at all degrees, and perhaps be denoted by name n1 at all degrees, but may
come to be denoted by n2 only at relatively lax degrees. In such a case the
identity statement
n1 = n2
will be vague. Thirdly, it is coceivable that objects which exist and are distinct
at some degree can become identical at some more generous degree. The se-
mantics ofF given above do not allow for such conflation, but it is an easy mat-
ter to incorporate it without changing the stock of valid sequents. Although
semantics for identity statements have not yet been detailed, this possibility of
conflation would seem to ensure that they behave semantically much like any
other atomic formulae. Clearly there are other options at the semantic level,
15See for example the seminal discussion by Evans [4]
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the most extreme of which would be to insist on constant domains (the same
for all degrees) in order to make identity rigid. Such proposals, naturally, would
affect what could be modeled in the way of vague identity and vague entity.
At any rate, non-constant domains (and therefore degrees of existence) are
needed to falsify unprovable sequents such as
∀x (Fx ∨ Gx) : ∀xFx ∨ ∃xGx
The usual intuitionist story as to why these are not wanted makes essential
reference to construction. It is because the construction process need not be
completed at any point and because only constructed objects count as existing
that variable domains occur and provide counter-examples to inferences like
the above. At a given point only Fs and no Gs may have been constructed,
while at later points some non-Fs could be constructed provided they are all
Gs. Some variant of this account emerges from the simple view that in math-
ematics nothing except provability counts as truth or from the recent more
sweeping verificationist thought that quite generally nothing except knowabil-
ity counts as truth. There is nothing specifically epistemic about the given
motivation for F. The analogue of investigation-dependent construction is
stretch-dependent truth. Clearly, though, an anti-realist account of reference
for terms and for sentences is congenial enough to the F perspective. On such
an account it is we who “stretch the truth" by setting our criteria with differ-
ent degrees of laxness. The naturalness of such a thought sits well with the
fact that the logic F is a subset of the intuitionist theory. Pursuing the philo-
sophical ramifications of the realist-antirealist debate with respect to vaguness
is another project to be postponed, however.
8 P   
At the risk of boring any reader diligent enough to have got this far, there now
follows yet another presentation of the logic F. This time it is as a cut-free
system to be styled GF in honour of Gentzen.16 Proofs in this style still relate
sequents, but now instead of elimination rules for connectives and quantifiers
on the right we have more introduction rules for their occurrences on the left,
so that proofs proceed only by construction, never by destruction.
We consider only finite sequents, allowing that they may be empty or single
on the right and have any finite bunch on the left. The structural rules are as
expected:
Γ(X,X) : [A]
W `
Γ(X) : [A]
16The system here called GF is roughly that called LLDBCK in [11]. The cut elimination
theorem is adapted from the one given in that paper.
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Γ(X, Y) : [A]
C `
Γ(Y, X) : [A]
Γ(X; Y) : [A]
C `
Γ(Y;X) : [A]
Γ(X) : [A]
K `
Γ(∆(X)) : [A]
X :
` K
X : A
Γ(X, (Y, Z)) : [A]
B `
Γ((X, Y), Z) : [A]
Γ(X; (Y;Z)) : [A]
B `
Γ((X; Y);Z) : [A]
Here ‘[A]’ is either a formula or nothing. Note that while the structural rules
of reassociation, weakening and exchange hold for both types of premise com-
bination, contraction (W) holds only for extensional combination.
The logical rules should again occasion no surprise:
Γ(A,B) : C
& `
Γ(A ∧ B) : C
X : A Y : B
` &
X, Y : A ∧ B
Γ(A;B) : C
◦ `
Γ(A ◦ B) : C
X : A Y : B
` ◦
X; Y : A ◦ B
Γ(A) : C Γ(B) : C
∨ `
Γ(A ∨ B) : C
X : A
` ∨
X : A ∨ B
X : B
` ∨
X : A ∨ B
X : A Γ(B) : C
→`
Γ(A→B;X) : C
X;A : B
`→
X : A→B
Γ(Atv) : B where t is free∀ ` for v in A
Γ(∀vA ; E!t) : B
X : A where v is not
` ∀ free in X
X : ∀vA
Γ(A) : B where v is not
∃ ` free in Γ(B)
Γ(∃vA) : B
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X : Atv where t is free` ∃ for v in A
X ; E!t : ∃vA
The axioms of GF are all sequents
A ` A
where A is an atomic formula, together with the special sequents
` E!v
and
⊥ `
A proof in GF is a finite tree of sequents each of which is either an axiom or
is related to its children by one of the above rules. It is a proof of the sequent
at its root.
Proof that every sequent derivable in GF is derivable in F is easy. For the
empty right-hand side we have to substitute something appropriate: ⊥ is ap-
propriate. Some of the cases require inductions on the complexity of bunch
contexts Γ but these are quite straightforward, especially given the (easily es-
tablished) admissibility in F of the rule Cut
X : A Γ(A) : B
Γ(X) : B
The converse proof, that everything provable in F is provable in GF is
harder. Again it goes through on a standard induction over lengths of proofs,
and again the key to making this work is proving the admissibility of Cut. This
time, however, the admissibility of Cut is less obvious. To prove it we actually
establish the apparently stronger result that the rule Mix is admissible. A mix,
for GF, is an inference of the form
X : A Γ(A . . .A) : [B]
Γ(X . . . X) : [B]
where
Γ(α . . . β)
is the generalisation of our previous notation indicating a bunch in which α
occurs, possibly many times in different contexts, and β, occurs in one distin-
guished context. The mix may replace any number of occurrences of the “mix
formula” A by occurrences of X. Ordinary Cut is the special case in which only
one occurrence is replaced.
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As usual, elimination is proved by double induction on rank (greatest num-
ber of steps since the introduction of any of the occurrences of the mix for-
mula) and degree (length of the mix formula). It will not be detailed here.
However, it is worth noting the form taken by the degree-reduction case where
there are several occurrences of the mix formula. By way of illustration, con-
sider the case of a mix whose mix formula A→B is introduced on both left and
right immediately before the mix:
X;A : B Γ(A→B . . . B) : C Y : A
`→ →`
X : A→B Γ(A→B . . . (A→B ; Y)) : C
mix
Γ(X . . . (X ; Y)) : C
Here the left premise comes by the left introduction rule for the mix formula,
but the mix may also replace other occurrences. After the transformation,
there remains a mix on A→B and two new mixes have been added:
X ;A : B
`→
X : A→B Γ(A→B . . . B) : C
mix
Γ(X . . . B) : C X ;A : B
mix
Γ(X . . . (X ;A)) : C Y : A
mix
Γ(X . . . (X ; Y)) : C
The mix onA→B has lower rank than the original and on induction hypothesis
is therefore eliminable, while the other two may have any rank but have lower
degree and so again are eliminable. Similar things happen in the other degree
reduction cases, and the rank reduction cases pose no special difficulties. After
a certain amount of the usual checking of cases, therefore, we may announce:
 16 (Mix Elimination) Let GFM be the system resulting from GF by the
addition of the rule Mix. Then every sequent provable in GFM is provable in GF.
Proof: Proof is by induction on degree and rank in that order of priority, and
is left as an exercise for the reader, who may use the above illustration as a
template.
 17 A sequent is provable in GF iff it is provable in F.
Proof: it is not difficult to turn a proof in GF into a proof of the same sequent
in F, remembering that formulae in the left side of sequents are to be repre-
sented by their atomic labels, and so must be assumed in the labelled deductive
system in order that the labels be assigned. Then each rule of GF can be em-
ulated quite straightforwardly in F. In the converse manner, every proof in F
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can be imitated in GFM (using cuts). The cut (or mix) elimination theorem
closes the circle by showing that a proof in GFM can be turned into one in
GF.
The fact that F has a cut-free equivalent in GF is useful in many ways. For
example, it affords an alternative proof of corollary 7, that F is a prime theory,
for the shortest cut-free proof of a sequent
` A ∨ B
must use the rule ` ∨ last, whence one of the disjuncts must be a theorem.
For the most important application of GF, however, we need some more defi-
nitions.
First, let us refer to the written representations of bunches on the left of
sequents as structures. A structure of the form X, Y is extensional while a formula
(standing in for its singleton) or a structure of the form X; Y is intensional. The
constituents of a structure are such of its intensional substructures as are not
themselves proper substructures of any of its intensional substructures. So the
sole constituent of an intensional structure is itself while the constituents of
X, Y are those of X together with those of Y. We think of the constituents
as a sequence rather than a set, because the structure is a sequentially written
object. A structure is reduced iff no substructure has two occurrences of the
same item among its constituents. It is semi-reduced iff no constituent has more
than two occurrences of the same item among its constituents. A sequent is
reduced or semi-reduced iff its left side is, and a proof is reduced or semi-
reduced iff every sequent in it is. By applying structural rules we can easily find
for any sequent S a reduced sequent r(S) which is provable iff S is provable.
 18 Every provable reduced sequent has a semi-reduced proof.
Proof: Proof is by induction on the construction of proofs. The key fact mak-
ing this induction trivial is that for any instance of a rule
S1 S2
R
S3
(where S2 may be null) either r(S1) = r(S3) or there is a derivation
r(S1) r(S2)
R
S14
... (n > 0)
Sn4
r(S3)
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in which each Si4 is semi-reduced and in which all the subsidiary inferences are
by structural rules. This is established simply but laboriously by cases. The
lemma is immediate.
A sequent in the present syntactically-oriented sense is supposed to rep-
resent a sequent in the former set-theoretic sense. It will help at this point
to define the equivalence between the two notions. For each structure X we
define the corresponding bunch B(X) as follows.
1. B(A) is just A.
2. Where X and Y are extensional structures B(X, Y) is B(X) ∪ B(Y) and
B(X; Y) is [B(X),B(Y)]
3. Where X and Y are intensional structures B(X; Y) is B(X) unionsq B(Y) and
B(X, Y) is {B(X),B(Y)}
4. Where X is an extensional structure and Y is an intensional structure
B(X, Y) is B(X) ∪ {B(Y)}, as is B(Y, X), while B(X; Y) and B(Y;X) are
[B(X)] unionsqB(Y).
We shall say that two sequents are abstractly equivalent iff they have the same
conclusion and their premises correspond to the same bunch. For instance,
A ;B : C is abstractly equivalent to (A ; (B,B)), (B ;A) : C in virtue of the idem-
potence of set union and the commutativity of multiset union. Next we define
the length of a sequent X : A to be the number of occurrences of subformulae
in B(X) and A.
 19 Propositional GF is decidable. Hence propositional F is decidable.
Proof: Proof is by induction on the length of sequents. It is obvious that short
sequents (of length 2 or less) are decidable. To decide a given sequent of greater
length we first note that it is provable iff its reduced equivalent is provable, and
that (by lemma 18) iff it has a semi-reduced proof. So we may restrict attention
to semi-reduced sequents. Now only finitely many semi-reduced sequents are
abstractly equivalent to the given one, and clearly these can be effectively gen-
erated. The structural rules B, C and W do not take us out of an abstract
equivalence class, so if our sequent has a proof then one of its semi-reduced
abstract equivalents has a proof whose last move is not B, C or W. But all the
other rules strictly increase length and so reversing them takes us to shorter
sequents whose provability we can decide. Moreover, there are at a given point
only finitely many ways for rules to apply (in jargon, the proof search tree has
the finite fork property), so after finitely much checking of possibilities we are
done.
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Time was when contributors to philosophical logic needed to do no more
than demonstrate the appropriateness of a logic for the abstract description of
validity across a chosen range. In those days it sufficed that language suitably
regimented had indeed the structure of the presented system. Now, though,
correctness is not enough. In the terms of the new electronic pragmatism, the
truth may not be pure but it had better be simple. It is therefore necessary at
this point to pass a few remarks on the suitability ofF for automated reasoning
purposes.
For reasons which have always escaped me,17 it is widely held that a good
first step towards practicability is that the propositional logic be decidable.
Propositional F is decidable. The decision procedure given in the last section
is in the form of a proof search method which delivers a proof if there is one
and otherwise delivers the information that there is not. In the quantified case,
too, a straightforward proof search based on the Gentzen formulation will find
a proof if one exists. Many of the methods of [15] can be used to improve on the
grossly inefficient behaviour of the naïve implementation of GF. In particular,
the structural rule of contraction can be omitted, its effects being written into
slightly generalised forms of the other rules. It is also easy to adapt the matrix
testing technique of [15] to prune the proof search tree radically. Work remains
to be done on the details of automating deductions in F and F*, but at least we
know what kind of work that is, and there is no shortage of recent research on
automated theorem proving from which it can start. It appears that as regards
automation, F is in at least as good shape as most nonstandard logics, and
indeed since contraction is the root of a good deal of computational evil in this
area it may well be in better shape than some.
9 C
The indicated strategy for us “deviant" logicians, then, is to set out a decent
alternative view such as that associated with system F, meeting Dummett’s
challenge in full, and in the light of such a coherent alternative to demand the
reasons for thinking modus ponens in its vicious form to be valid. On Dummett’s
own admission that inference leads from assertible premises to absurd conclu-
sions, so what can be meant by the claim that it is valid, and what sorts of
evidence of its validity are forthcoming? This paper has presented a system of
logic meeting all sensible criteria of adequacy. F has a very natural and gras-
pable formulation giving the quantifiers and connectives the deductive prop-
erties they should have; it has a set of plausible semantic interpretations; it has
a straightforward cut-free equivalent; at the propositional level it is decidable;
it lends itself to automated reasoning. On the general grounds that consistent
17Church long ago demonstrated that all worthwhile logics are undecidable, so decidability
is not a necessary condition for anything that really matters. Nor of course is it a sufficient
condition, for it is consistent with decidability that the worst case (and indeed average case)
complexity of all decision algorithms be such as to render them unworkable.
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solutions to philosophical difficulties are to be welcomed where available, it
seems at least that the burden of more argument is shifted back to the ortho-
dox view.18
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